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IN DEFENSE OF NON-NATURAL THEISTIC REALISM: 
A RESPONSE TO WIELENBERG
William J. Wainwright
Eric Wielenberg and I agree that basic moral truths are necessarily true. But 
Wielenberg thinks that, because these truths are necessary, they require no ex-
planation, and I do not: some basic moral truths are not self-explanatory. I ar-
gue that Wielenberg’s reasons for thinking that my justification of that claim 
is inadequate are ultimately unconvincing.
J. L. Mackie has persuasively argued that a belief in the objectivity of 
moral values is deeply embedded in most mainstream moral philosophy, 
and presupposed in ordinary moral thought and discourse.1 Mackie him-
self regards moral realism as mistaken and offers an error theory of the 
belief in morality’s objectivity. But given that the appearance of objectiv-
ity is a feature of ordinary moral experience and practice, a belief in its 
objectivity appears to be the default position. Other things being equal, 
their apparent objectivity is a good reason for thinking that moral values 
really are objective. So if theists can provide an explanation of moral val-
ues which respects the appearance of objectivity, and is at least as good 
an explanation of their apparent objectivity as Mackie’s, then their ap-
parent objectivity is a sufficient reason for preferring the theist’s account 
to Mackie’s.
In Religion and Morality,2 I argued that a suitably qualified divine com-
mand theory fills the bill, although I conceded that Linda Zagzebski’s 
Divine Motivation Theory, and other religious theories such as Neo-
platonism, might do so as well. Of course even if this is correct, theists3 
aren’t home free since there are non-religious alternatives which preserve 
at least some of the appearances. Richard Boyd’s ethical naturalism and 
Christine Korsgaard’s constructivism are examples. I argued, however, 
that a divine command theory which incorporates the claims that God 
necessarily exists and necessarily forbids such things as lying or the tor-
ture of innocents does a better job of preserving the appearances than 
either Boyd’s or Korsgaard’s.
1J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth & New York: Penguin, 
1977), chap. 1.
2William J. Wainwright, Religion and Morality (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005).
3And other religious believers.
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Even so, there is a formidable difficulty. Four conditions must be met if 
values are to be objective in my and Mackie’s sense. First, value claims are 
true or false. Second, values are universal. If something is prima facie good 
or right it is prima facie good or right at all times and places. Third, values 
aren’t artifacts of our desires and preferences. And, fourth, values are part 
of the “furniture of the universe.” Goodness and rightness, for example, 
are real properties of the things that have them. If I am correct, though, 
basic moral facts are necessary facts. “Lying is prima facie wrong,” for in-
stance, or “Loyalty is a moral excellence” are true in all possible worlds. 
Yet if they are, moral values meet all four criteria of objectivity simply in 
virtue of their necessity. Claims about basic moral values are either neces-
sarily true or necessarily false. The values in question are also universal. 
Since propositions expressing basic value facts are necessarily true, they 
are true in all possible worlds. Our third criterion is met as well. Necessary 
facts such as the facts of logic or mathematics aren’t constituted by our 
willing or desiring them. Finally, if basic value claims are necessarily true, 
the facts that they express are as much part of the structure of reality as 
the facts of logic and mathematics. The objection is therefore this. If basic 
value claims are necessarily true, their objectivity is assured, and there is 
no reason to bring God into the picture. An appeal to theistic metaphysics 
is thus otiose. Like facts of logic and mathematics, basic value facts are 
necessary and need no further explanation.
However, in my opinion, there is an important difference between 
logical or mathematical facts and necessary value facts. The former are 
analytic; their logical necessity is a consequence of definitions and logical 
or syntactic rules. Some necessary facts, on the other hand, are synthetic. 
While they hold in all possible worlds, they can’t be deduced from defini-
tions and logical rules. The constraints that truths like these impose are 
substantive and not merely formal. While analytic or “narrowly” neces-
sary truths stand in no need of explanation, many synthetic or “broadly” 
necessary truths would appear to do so. Because necessary basic moral 
truths aren’t analytic, it wouldn’t be too surprising, then, if they too stood 
in need of explanation.4
Eric Wielenberg disagrees. In an excellent article in this journal,5 Wielen-
berg shows that it is not as easy to construct a compelling case for God’s 
4Note, too, that on objectivist moral accounts, the property of moral rightness necessarily 
supervenes on such things as truth telling and moral goodness necessarily supervenes on 
certain character types. The connection between the supervenient and subvenient properties 
can seem mysterious, however. For in the absence of further explanation, the (necessary) 
connection between such radically different sorts of properties (the psychological properties 
constituting Socrates’ character, say, and the “non-natural” [that is, non-empirical] property 
of moral goodness) is just an inexplicable brute fact. Theistic metaphysics can mitigate the 
problem because “the theist has a suitably ‘queer’ world-view into which to fit these ‘queer’ 
objects.” (Robert Gay, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” Modern Theology 3 [1987], 
p. 123.) Metaphysical naturalists have no corresponding recourse.
5Eric J. Wielenberg, “In Defense of Non-natural, Non-theistic Moral Realism,” Faith and 
Philosophy 26 (2009), pp. 23–41. Parenthetical page references are to this text.
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existence on the basis of the existence of objective moral facts as theists 
like William Craig and J. P. Moreland suppose. I am not persuaded by his 
criticisms of me, however.
Wielenberg’s and my views on morality are similar in a number of im-
portant respects. We are both ethical realists; we agree that there are objec-
tive moral facts. We also agree that propositions expressing basic ethical 
facts (e.g., “It is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on the innocent”) are nec-
essarily true. Nor do either of our commitments to moral realism rest upon 
theism. Wielenberg rejects any form of supernaturalism and embraces a 
view of ethics like G. E. Moore’s. As for me, I am at least as firmly con-
vinced of the objective truth and necessity of “It is prima facie wrong to 
inflict pain upon the innocent” as I am of the truth of theism.
Where then do we differ? Wielenberg thinks that at least some “ethical 
states of affairs that obtain necessarily . . . are brute facts. . . . To ask of such 
facts, ‘where do they come from?’ or ‘on what foundation do they rest?’ 
is misguided in much the same way that, according to many theists, it is 
misguided to ask of God ‘where does He come from?’ or ‘on what founda-
tion does He rest?’” (p. 26). I disagree with Wielenberg on this point. But 
before explaining why, a couple of clarifications might prove helpful.
First—though I have not always been as clear about this as I should—
the ethical facts which most obviously cry out for explanation are facts 
about moral obligation, and divine command theories like Robert Adams’s 
and Philip Quinn’s were specifically designed to explain why benevo-
lence, say, is not just good, but morally required. I am sympathetic with 
views like Adams’s which identify Goodness itself with God, and did not 
mean to suggest that God’s goodness requires an external explanation. So 
I agree with Wielenberg that not every value fact cries out for an explana-
tion in terms of something distinct from it. The fact remains that Wielen-
berg thinks that statements of basic moral obligation stand in no need 
of explanation and I do. The question expressed by “I agree that truth 
telling is prima facie good but why is it obligatory?” is neither confused 
nor misguided.
Second (and I am sure Wielenberg would agree), metaphysical ques-
tions should be distinguished from epistemic questions. That statements 
of basic moral obligation like “One has a prima facie duty to assist those in 
distress” are obviously true and stand in no need of justification doesn’t 
entail that they don’t stand in need of explanation.
So what exactly are Wielenberg’s objections? “Wainwright offers two 
reasons for his claim that God’s existence does not cry out for explanation 
but necessary ethical facts do. The first is that God is essentially causeless 
whereas ethical facts are not. . . . But my view is that at least some ethi-
cal facts are essentially causeless. For example, it seems to me that there 
is no possible world in which the state of affairs that pain is intrinsically 
bad is caused to obtain.” And to my claim that “an indication” of the fact 
that “no ethical facts are essentially causeless” is “that we can coherently 
conceive that moral facts have causes”—“divine command theories, for 
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example, are not obviously incoherent”—Wielenberg replies that a lack 
of obvious incoherence isn’t sufficient to establish a thing’s metaphysi-
cal possibility. I deny that God’s non-existence is metaphysically possible, 
for example, even though I recognize that his non-existence isn’t obviously 
incoherent. Wielenberg concludes that his claim that some basic ethical 
facts are essentially causeless (and hence it is metaphysically impossible 
that they have causes) is therefore no worse off than my claim that God’s 
non-existence is metaphysically impossible (p. 29).
At least two things seem to be wrong with this, however. In the first 
place, because my concern is only with facts of basic moral obligation, we 
are owed an example of a basic moral obligation which is such that there is 
no possible world in which it has a causal explanation, and Wielenberg 
doesn’t provide such an example. But second (and more importantly), the 
two cases (the metaphysical impossibility of God’s non-existence and the 
metaphysical impossibility of basic moral facts having causes) are rele-
vantly dissimilar. Wielenberg is of course right to insist that a lack of ob-
vious incoherence isn’t sufficient to establish a thing’s metaphysical pos-
sibility. Nor is the fact that I can imagine it. I can imagine what backwards 
time travel is like (by reading H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine, for example). 
Nor is it obviously incoherent. Nevertheless, there are plausible arguments 
purporting to show that backwards time travel isn’t metaphysically pos-
sible. Similarly, even though the fact that I can imagine “that there is a 
stone floating in space with nothing else (including God) in existence” 
(p. 29) and that what I imagine isn’t obviously incoherent isn’t sufficient 
to show that God’s non-existence is metaphysically possible, the thrust 
of arguments like Anselm’s, Leibniz’s, Hartshorne’s, and Plantinga’s is 
that his non-existence is not metaphysically possible. By contrast, if di-
vine command theory is true, the facts expressed by statements of moral 
obligation do have causes or distinct grounds. Hence, if divine command 
theory is possibly true, it is possible that all facts of moral obligation have 
causes or external grounds, in which case facts of moral obligation thus 
are not essentially causeless. For the two cases to be genuinely parallel, 
then, Wielenberg would have to show that there are reasons for think-
ing that divine command theory isn’t metaphysically possible which are 
at least as strong as the arguments offered by Leibniz and others for the 
metaphysical impossibility of God’s non-existence. And Wielenberg hasn’t 
done that.
As Wielenberg notes my “second reason for the view that God’s exis-
tence does not demand an explanation in the way that necessary ethical 
facts do is that God’s existence is ‘self-explanatory or intrinsically intel-
ligible’ which implies that ‘if we could grasp [God’s] nature we would see 
why it exists’” (p. 29).
Wielenberg finds three things that are wrong with this. First, “it is not 
at all clear that this notion of a self-explanatory being is coherent.” Sec-
ond, even if it is coherent, “the concept of a self-explanatory God is surely 
at least as mysterious as the bruteness of the ethical facts it is supposed 
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to help explain.” If so, then, “in the context of worries about the relative 
‘queerness’ of” ethical approaches like Wielenberg’s “as compared with a 
theistic approach” like mine, “the appeal to the obscure notion that God 
is a self-explanatory being hardly tips the balance in favor of” the latter. 
Third, “the appeal to God’s existence being self-explanatory seems merely 
to introduce a new non-trivial necessary truth into the picture: that God’s 
nature has whatever mysterious feature(s) explains His existence.” And 
because “the presence of this remarkable feature in the divine nature . . . is 
not explained by a distinct state of affairs,” it is just as much a brute fact as 
ethical facts are on views like Wielenberg’s or G. E. Moore’s. If it is, then, 
with respect to the existence of brute non-trivial necessary facts, views like 
mine offer no advantage over views like Wielenberg’s (p. 30).
How strong are these objections? Wielenberg’s only support for the first 
(the suspicion that the concept of a self-explanatory being is incoherent) 
is a reference to a 1980 essay by John Morreall.6 Morreall’s arguments are 
less than convincing, however, relying as they do on such highly ques-
tionable claims as “Existence [and even necessary existence?] can’t be a 
predicate” and “Individuals possess their essences contingently.” Wielen-
berg’s second objection is stronger. The notion of a self-explanatory being 
is “obscure” and to that extent “mysterious.” Whether it is as mysterious 
as the concept of brute facts of basic moral obligation is another matter. It 
isn’t clear to me that it is, but Wielenberg’s and my intuitions on this point 
differ, and I know of no arguments that would be likely to resolve our 
conflict of intuitions.
Wielenberg’s third argument calls for more discussion. If P is an essen-
tial property of something, x, then that x has P isn’t mysterious, doesn’t 
cry out for an explanation. Nor is the fact that a thing has the essential 
properties it does mysterious. Neither the fact that Euclidian triangles are 
essentially such that their angles sum to 180 degrees nor (if Aristotle is 
right) the fact that humans are essentially rational cries out for an explana-
tion. But that Euclidian triangles or humans or God or facts of basic moral 
obligation exist is another matter. And while God’s existence may be self-
explanatory, the existence of humans and, arguably, that of basic moral 
obligations and platonic entities like Euclidian triangles is not.
So are God’s existence and the existence of facts of basic moral obliga-
tion, on a view like Wielenberg’s, equally “brute”? In Wielenberg’s sense, 
yes, for he defines a brute fact as a state of affairs whose obtaining “is not 
explained by a distinct state of affairs” (p. 30, cf. p. 25). There are at least 
two other senses of “brute fact,” however. In the first, facts are brute if and 
only if they are contingent but have no explanation. On some views, the 
existence of the physical cosmos or the obtaining of the basic laws of na-
ture are brute facts in this sense. In the second, facts are brute if and only 
if they are susceptible of a distinct explanation yet lack one. Since both 
6John Morreall, “God as Self-Explanatory,” The Philosophical Quarterly 30 (July 1980), pp. 
206–214.
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God’s existence and facts of basic moral obligation are necessary, neither 
are brute facts in the first of these senses. But on my view, while God’s 
existence isn’t susceptible of a distinct explanation,7 the existence of facts 
of basic moral obligation is. The latter, if lacking an external explanation, 
is thus brute in a way in which the former is not. Moreover, since only 
facts that are brute in one or the other of these two senses8 cry out for an 
explanation, the existence of facts of basic moral obligation on a view like 
Wielenberg’s requires an explanation in a way in which the God of classi-
cal theism does not. The two cases, then, aren’t really on a par.
There is more to be said, of course. I have suggested “that at least some 
theistic approaches can explain the supervenience of the moral on the 
non-moral and that this feature of such approaches gives them an advan-
tage over theories (like [Wielenberg’s]) that cannot offer a deeper explana-
tion for the supervenience. . . . Robert Adams’s theory in Finite and Infi-
nite Goods” is an example of such an approach. Wielenberg thinks that the 
apparent advantage of theories like Adams’s is illusory, however, since 
those theories, like his, entail “the existence of brute ethical facts” (p. 30). 
“Among such facts are the following: That the Good exists, that the Good 
is loving . . . , and that the Good is just. . . . Indeed, once we see that, on 
Adams’s view, the Good = God, we see that Adams’s theory entails that 
the Good has no external foundation, since God has no external founda-
tion. It is not merely that Adams’s view fails to specify where the Good 
comes from;” it “implies that the Good did not come from anywhere”9 (p. 
32, cf. pp. 39–40).
However, if the explicanda are facts of basic moral obligation rather than 
value facts in general, then theories like Adams’s have a clear advantage 
over theories like Wielenberg’s, for even though both may appeal to the 
badness of pain, say to justify the claim that we have a prima facie duty not 
to inflict it, the former can explain both the badness of pain and its moral 
forbiddenness while the latter cannot. On a view like Adams’s, pain is 
bad because it is the opposite of a quality that resembles a feature of “the 
necessarily existing divine nature” (p. 31), namely, his unbounded joy, and 
its infliction is forbidden because God prohibits it. On a view like Wielen-
berg’s, the intrinsic badness of pain has no further explanation, and even if 
pain’s intrinsic badness supplies us with a reason not to inflict it, it doesn’t 
follow that we are morally obligated not inflict it. A theory like Adams’s can 
thus explain more than a theory like Wielenberg’s and that is a reason for 
preferring it.
7God’s aseity logically precludes his having a distinct explanation.
8And not merely brute in Wielenberg’s sense.
9Does the fact that God is the Good, though, require an explanation? I think it doesn’t be-
cause “God is the Good” is a statement of identity, and statements of identity don’t require 
explanations. Or in any case, not causal or quasi-causal explanations. There is no causal 
or quasi-causal explanation of the fact that water = H2O, for instance, or that the morning 
star = the evening star.
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I don’t pretend that these remarks settle the dispute between us. But to 
put them in perspective, let me conclude by repeating a remark which I 
have made elsewhere. In a theistic or Platonic world, the Good lies at the 
heart of reality. The existence of objective values or of necessary connec-
tions between natural (i.e., empirical) properties and the value properties 
that supervene upon them are surely less surprising in a world of this sort 
than in a world in which what is deepest is matter, energy, natural law, or 
chance. While the existence of objective values is formally consistent with 
a naturalistic metaphysics, it doesn’t comport well with it. And, indeed, 
the unpopularity of moral realism among most committed metaphysical 
naturalists can be largely attributed to just this sense of incoherence or 
lack of fit. It is telling, I think, that most metaphysical naturalists share the 
reaction of theists who believe that the existence of objective values would 
require an explanation but deny their existence since they see no way of 
providing one.10
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
10William J. Wainwright, “Response to Maria Antonacci,” Conversations in Religion and 
Theology 4 (November 2006), pp. 224–228. Cf. Wainwright, Religion and Morality, p. 67.
